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The Impact of Counsel:
An Analysis of Empirical Evidence
Rebecca L. Sandefur1
INTRODUCTION
In this article, I provide three lenses on empirical evidence about the
American public’s experience with civil justice problems: the depth of
public experience, the scope of public experience, and the impact of counsel
on public experience. The analysis of empirical evidence reveals a
fundamental problem with traditional U.S. thinking and policy concerning
access to justice: both are too narrowly focused on law and formal legal
institutions. To move forward, we need both new understanding and new
policies. New understanding comes from viewing justice problems from the
public’s perspective. New policies should include providing effective,
accessible, nonlegal routes to solutions for common and significant civil
justice problems; these routes will be a necessary complement to the
traditional solution of more access to law.
The first two sections of this paper assess empirical evidence about how
frequently Americans encounter civil justice problems and how these
problems affect them and society at large. Millions of Americans are
currently experiencing significant civil justice problems.2 Such troubles are
common and widespread, and their impact both on the people who
experience them and the public as a whole can be deep and long lasting.3
This article’s third section reviews evidence about how lawyers affect
public experience with civil justice problems, focusing particularly on how
lawyer representation changes the outcomes of adjudicated civil cases. Most
Americans’ civil justice problems are never taken to lawyers for advice nor
are they pursued in courts or tribunals.4 When justice problems do become
cases that are adjudicated, many people appear without attorneys.5 When
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people are represented by attorneys, they are, on average, more likely to win
in adjudication than are people who are unrepresented.6 But how much
more likely varies greatly; the observed difference in case outcomes
between attorney-represented and unrepresented members of the public
varies widely across different kinds of civil justice problems and different
studies of lawyers’ impact.7 One factor that seems to shape variation in the
magnitude of lawyers’ impact is procedural complexity—the complexity of
the documents and procedures necessary to pursue a justice problem as a
court case appears to account for some of lawyers’ effect on case
outcomes.8
Taken together, these findings support some traditional calls for reform,
but they also suggest innovative avenues through which the United States
might expand access to justice. Observers have advocated perennially for
greater access to law—more access to counsel and simplified procedures
that would allow ordinary people to pursue civil cases without legal
representation. These traditional routes to expanding access to justice are
clearly indicated. However, they will not go far enough. The solution is not
more of the same; it is, rather, something new entirely. Our typical ways of
conceptualizing people’s experiences with civil justice problems focus too
narrowly on law. Stepping back to look at the whole canvas of public
experience with civil justice problems reveals that we need not merely
additional access to law, but also more creativity in thinking about access to
justice.

I. THE DEPTH OF CIVIL JUSTICE PROBLEMS’ IMPACT
For many members of the American public, civil justice problems emerge
“at the intersection of civil law and everyday adversity.”9 These problems
can involve family relationships, work, money, insurance, pensions, wages,
benefits, housing, and property—to name just a few areas of contemporary
life. Though these different types of problems affect different aspects of
peoples’ lives and concern different kinds of relationships, they share a
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certain important quality: they are problems that have civil legal aspects,
raise civil legal issues, and have consequences shaped by civil law, even
though the people who experience them may never think of them as “legal”
and may never attempt to use law to try to resolve them.10 Such problems
are both common, as I will describe in the next section,11 and impactful, as I
illustrate in this one.
A clear image of the depth of impact of civil justice problems is provided
by allowing members of the public to speak for themselves about their own
experiences. I tell a single story here, but it represents many. It comes from
a series of focus groups that I conducted in two midsize cities in the
Midwestern region of the United States during the autumns of 2005 and
2007. Participants in these groups were randomly selected to be invited to
spend a couple of hours on a weeknight in a library or community center
meeting room to discuss “problems facing American families today.” The
first exercise in the focus groups was to go around the room and ask each
person to tell a story about a problem that he or she had experienced in any
of a variety of different arenas including with housing, finances, bills, child
support, divorce, and the like. The focus group facilitator and I made no
mention of the fact that the study was about civil justice problems or law;
we simply asked people to tell us about problems they were having.12
Countless aspects of life in contemporary market democracies are shaped
by civil law, so it will come as no surprise that a substantial proportion of
everyday problems that people in the focus groups described were civil
justice problems.13 By this, I do not mean that people thought of these
problems as “legal” problems—they typically did not—nor that these
problems were necessarily best resolved through law. Rather, these
problems raised civil legal issues, had civil legal aspects, and had
consequences shaped by civil law, as the story I am about to recount
illustrates.
This account was related by a woman in her mid-thirties. Though she
earned too much to meet the means-tested requirements for Legal Services
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Corporation (LSC)-funded civil legal aid (an income less than 125 percent
of the federal poverty level), her family’s income was still low in relative
terms—less than 80 percent of her county’s median income.14 As we sat in
plastic chairs around a slightly sticky table in the small community center’s
classroom, drinking soda and eating cheese crackers and oatmeal cookies,
this is the story that she told:
About five years ago, I used to pay insurance. I used to pay about
$300 of insurance for my kids and then my kids weren’t going to
the doctor, so I decided I was going to take them off insurance and
go on [Community Care, her state’s insurance program for lowincome children]. Well, right as I almost qualified for [Community
Care], my thirteen-year-old got killed. So then, he didn’t have no
health insurance and neither did my fifteen-year old, who also got
shot.
So then that leads back down here to collections and [the hospital]
wants me to pay for it. And I keep telling them, “I’m not paying
for that.” So they want me to get a loan so that I can pay for it. So
what I did was go back to the district attorney’s office and see if
the people who killed my son, pay for it. But since they’re in
prison, it’s going to be on my credit forever. So that causes me a
lot of pain because I can’t even look at buying a house. Because
they want me to pay for it and wait until the money trickles, you
know, from here to thirty years. . . .
This is a particularly tragic account of experience with civil justice
problems. It is not unique, however. As with many situations people
described in the focus groups, here, an initial problem triggered a series of
problems that would affect the lives of those involved for many years to
come. Significant civil justice problems and the consequences they create
are neither exceptional nor unusual.15 Civil justice problems can have a
wide-ranging and deep impact, not only on the people who experience
them, but also on the societies in which these people live, both as illustrated
above and as documented in research based on large, national population
surveys.

CIVIL LEGAL REPRESENTATION

The Impact of Counsel

Scholars working with the England and Wales Civil and Social Justice
Surveys have found that people’s experiences with civil justice problems
can lead to physical health problems, mental health problems, the
breakdown of family relationships, loss of housing, lost employment, and
lost income—among other adverse consequences.16 An initial civil justice
problem can thus cascade into a shower of problems, some related to civil
law and others not.17
The impact of civil justice problems is borne not only by the people who
experience them but also by society at large. Research in the United
Kingdom reveals that the adverse health consequences of civil justice
problems can lead to increased public expenditures on the provision of
medical services.18 It also shows that lost employment as a consequence of
civil justice problems can lead to increased expenditures on public
benefits.19 It further documents that, while some people who lose their
housing as a result of civil justice problems are able to find new shelter,
others are not and so must stay in temporary accommodation, some of
which is publicly subsidized and, thus, represents an additional public
expense.20
As other research shows, the costs are not solely fiscal in nature. A study
drawing on a recent Canadian survey of public experience with civil justice
problems finds that “[t]he mere fact of experiencing” a civil justice
problem—whether or not the problem involves contact with the law or the
justice system—is “related to the view that the law and the justice system
are unfair.”21 This sense of unfairness appears to be exacerbated when
justice problems go unresolved.22 These deep and wide-ranging
consequences flow from civil justice problems that are quite common in
contemporary America.
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II. THE SCOPE OF PUBLIC EXPERIENCE WITH CIVIL JUSTICE
PROBLEMS
The United States’ more than three hundred million people23 experience
many problems that have civil legal aspects and raise civil legal issues.24
Here, and in other western market democracies, these problems are so
common as to be “nearly normal features of everyday life.”25 The best
estimates available for the scope of the American public’s experience with
civil justice problems are based on information that was collected long
before the recent recession. In fact, the most recent survey of the population
is from 1992, and it provides information representing the experiences of
only a portion of the American public.26 This 1992 survey is not
comprehensive, as it excludes one-fifth of the population, the highestearning 20 percent of households.27 The last truly comprehensive surveys of
public experience with civil justice problems are more than three decades
out of date, conducted in the 1970s.28
Like most contemporary civil justice surveys, the 1992 survey presented
respondents with lists of specific problems, each carefully selected to be
problems that raised issues in civil law, and then asked whether respondents
had experienced each during a specified period of time before the survey—
in this case, one year.29 General categories queried included those involving
family, work, benefits, housing, debt, credit, and neighborhood problems.
Specific problems included events like “not having money to pay bills,”30
“serious dispute with tax people,”31 “had difficulty collecting pay,”32 and
“separation, divorce, or annulment.”33
The 1992 U.S. survey revealed that about half of surveyed households
had been experiencing at least one serious civil justice problem in the
twelve months prior to the survey.34 If one project forward that rate of
problems experienced to today, the projection implies that more than fortyfour million households (in which live more than one hundred million
people) are experiencing at least one nontrivial civil justice problem.35
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One hundred million people affected each year may seem staggeringly
large—it is on the order of one-third of the U.S. population—but it is in fact
a conservative estimate for the scope of the American public’s experience
with civil justice problems. More than one hundred million people are
estimated to live in households with incomes of less than $90,000 a year
and are experiencing at least one civil justice problem—this excludes the
justice problems experienced by the rest of the population, the additional
90.9 million people who live in households with incomes of $90,000 per
year or more.36
But one hundred million affected each year is a conservative estimate,
even for the justice problems of the low- and moderate-income public. The
current recession will likely have increased the number of people
experiencing hardships like foreclosure,37 job loss,38 trouble paying medical
bills,39 difficulties with consumer debt,40 and eviction41—all of which can
produce civil justice problems or be civil justice problems in and of
themselves.42 In addition, the survey techniques used in the 1992 national
study may lead to underestimates of how often people experience different
kinds of justice problems. Traditional surveys typically use the past twelve
months to five years as their frame of reference when asking people to
report on their justice problems.43 Some scholars argue that the
retrospective focus of such studies leads to underreporting because people
fail to remember or report all the problems that they have experienced in the
past.44 A recent study estimates that these kinds of surveys may understate
the incidence of civil justice problems by a factor of as much as twothirds.45 We can conclude, therefore, that the American public faces a
substantial volume of civil justice problems—probably many more
problems than suggested by the most recent U.S. civil justice survey.
Under any expansion of access to legal services, whether as a right or
through other means, only some of these more than one hundred million
people living with civil justice problems would likely be eligible for
publicly subsidized legal advice or lawyer representation. The current
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means test for LSC-funded legal services is an annual household income of
no more than 125 percent of the federal poverty level. For a family of four
in 2008, this threshold would have been an income less than about
$27,530.46 As Figure 1 demonstrates, in 2008 there were more than 53.8
million people living in households eligible by this means test. Based on
projections from the 1992 survey, an estimated 25.3 million people eligible
for LSC-funded services were living in households experiencing at least one
civil justice problem. Some contemporary proposals would extend a
government subsidy for access to lawyers’ services farther along the
household income distribution, up to 200 percent of poverty.47 For a family
of four in 2008, that threshold would have been a household income of
around $44,050.48 If implemented as a national means test, the 200 percent
of poverty standard would imply a projected more than 96.3 million people
living in households eligible for subsidized civil legal services, an estimated
47.4 million of whom would be living in households experiencing at least
one civil justice problem.
Figure 1. Estimated Numbers of People Eligible for Civil Legal Aid and
Living with Civil Justice Problems, by Means-Tested Household
Income: USA, 2008.
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For the more than ninety-six million people living in households with
incomes below 200 percent of poverty in 2008, these conservative, prerecession estimates of experience with civil justice problems imply, for
example:
 12 million people living in households experiencing at least one
civil justice problem related to livelihood (whether from
employment, pensions, or public benefits), including discrimination,
problems with wages or pensions, and problems with working
conditions;
 9.9 million people living in households experiencing at least one
civil justice problem involving family or domestic situations,
including problems involving divorce, elder abuse, domestic
violence, or child support; and
 16.4 million people living in households experiencing at least one
civil justice problem involving personal finances, including
problems with insurance, taxes, debt, and credit.49

III. LAWYERS’ IMPACT ON PUBLIC EXPERIENCE WITH CIVIL JUSTICE
PROBLEMS
As these estimates suggest, civil justice problems are so common as to be
“features of everyday life” in contemporary U.S. society.50 And, while such
problems are very common, legal responses to them are not. Turning to law
is not Americans’ usual reaction to their civil justice problems.51 In this
respect, Americans are similar to residents of most other contemporary
developed nations: “Although studies reveal that different societies provide
diverse routes for resolving civil justice problems, they also reveal that the
majority of problems never make it to law, lawyers, or the civil justice
system.”52
Despite representations in the media that would imply otherwise,53
Americans typically do not find legal remedies to their civil justice
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problems. Forty years of civil justice surveys reveal that the vast majority of
civil justice problems are never taken either to lawyers or to a court or other
hearing body.54 Most civil justice problems do not involve advice from an
attorney.55 The 1992 national survey of the American public’s experience
with civil justice problems found that 24 percent of problems involved
consulting an attorney.56 Such a consultation did not necessarily involve the
receipt of legal services; in some instances, it went no further than a
discussion about whether or not the attorney would take the case.57 Earlier
U.S. studies found similarly low rates of consultation with lawyers for help
with civil justice problems,58 and more recent state-level civil justice
surveys focused on low-income populations also found low rates of lawyer
consultation for civil justice problems.59
Most civil justice problems are not adjudicated in front of hearing bodies.
According to the 1992 survey, only 14 percent of civil justice problems
were taken to a court or hearing body.60 Certain kinds of civil justice
problems are more likely than others to lead to contact with courts or
tribunals. For example, the 1992 survey found that 37 percent of family and
domestic problems involved a court or hearing body, while 12 percent of
employment-related problems and 11 percent of civil justice problems
involving personal finances involved courts or other hearing bodies.61
Notwithstanding this variation in the kinds of problems more and less likely
to be taken to lawyers or heard in courts, most of the public’s civil justice
problems do not make it to the formal legal system.
When members of the public do seek resolution from a court or tribunal,
they often appear as self-represented litigants. National statistics regarding
self-representation do not exist, but studies in individual jurisdictions
suggest that a majority of certain types of cases—including family and
domestic cases and unlawful detainer disputes—involve at least one selfrepresented litigant.62 Some states report that as many as 90 percent of
certain kinds of cases involve at least one self-represented litigant.63
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A. Public Experience with Civil Justice Problems and a Right to Counsel
Arguments for a right to counsel in civil matters have often centered on
precisely this issue: that many members of the lay public who appear in
civil hearings and trials do so without the representation of a lawyer.64
Implied in this rationale is the belief that the presence of lawyers changes
something important. For example, in the absence of lawyer representation,
meritorious cases might nevertheless lose when presented by people who do
not know how to communicate those merits effectively by using the terms
and the means that courts and judges understand. In addition, attorneys may
provide an advantage in litigation that is independent from the merits of a
case. To the extent that courts treat the unsophisticated or inexperienced
litigants who self-represent as equivalent to litigants who are represented by
attorneys, attorney-represented litigants who square off against selfrepresented litigants may benefit from the sheer imbalance of
representation. As Mark Galanter famously argued in his analysis of “why
the ‘haves’ come out ahead,” the ability to hire attorneys is one of the
advantages enjoyed by the “haves” that—regardless of the rightness of their
cause—permit them to prevail more often than the “have nots.”65 In this
understanding, a right to counsel would be a move toward a basic equality
of arms.66
Yet, only a modest amount of research effort has gone into investigating
the question of how lawyers change what happens in courtrooms, perhaps
because the claim that they do so seems self-evident to many observers.
Over the past half century, a few dozen published67 studies have empirically
investigated the relationship between lawyer representation and what
happens in adjudicated civil cases. These studies typically inquire into
whether, and sometimes how, the presence of attorneys changes the
outcomes of civil trials and hearings. By reviewing these studies together,
one can gain new information about lawyers’ impact on public experience
with civil justice problems.
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B. Empirical Evidence about Lawyer Representation and Public Experience
with Civil Justice Problems
My review of the evidence examines a very specific component of
lawyers’ impact: how much lawyer representation changes the outcomes of
formal adjudication. This impact, of course, does not comprise all that
lawyers do. Among other work, attorneys advise, counsel, and negotiate;
they identify, cultivate, and pursue test and impact cases; they control
access to law by screening cases for representation or not; they organize
small claims that would go unattended into large classes that become the
object of legal action and public scrutiny; and they engage in legislative
advocacy and grassroots organizing. Nevertheless, a central part of the legal
profession’s contribution to the public’s access to law and justice is the
lawyers’ work of advocacy in hearings and trials.
1. Meta-Analysis
This review takes the form of a meta-analysis—a quantitative research
synthesis that uses the findings of extant research to produce a summary of
general knowledge about a given phenomenon.68 I focus on a single
empirical question: how much does lawyer representation affect who wins
and loses in adjudication? My review is agnostic about whether lawyers’
work makes the outcomes of adjudication “better” in the sense of making
them more legally accurate or substantively just. Rather, the inquiry is into
what we know about whether lawyers make outcomes different than they
would be in the absence of attorney representation.
Combining research in a synthetic review requires that the studies be
comparable in design, and that they report all the information necessary to
construct quantitative measures of the relationship between lawyer
representation and case outcomes. Because no impact of counsel research
canon yet exists in the literature, the various extant studies exhibit little
consensus about terminology, methodology, or theoretical approach. In
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conducting the synthetic review, a number of studies had to be excluded for
reasons of research design or incomplete reporting of results.
To serve for the meta-analysis, studies had to present quantitative
summaries of the outcomes of civil contests that were formally
adjudicated—that is, actually taken to trial and heard—in courts or tribunals
somewhere in the United States. In order to permit comparisons between
other-represented and self-represented parties, studies had to include (on at
least one side of the dispute) parties who could potentially appear
unrepresented by any agent, i.e., private individuals. In order to provide
information that could be generalized to the whole population of cases
heard in a particular kind of forum, the studies had to report on a sample of
cases that was representative of the population of cases being studied. The
published reports needed to provide sufficient information to construct
measures of the number of cases won and lost by the type of representation
used. In particular, studies had to distinguish between cases represented by
qualified attorneys and cases represented by other kinds of advocates, such
as law students or paralegals. I did not exclude studies that distinguished
between represented and unrepresented parties on only one side of a
dispute, as this would have eliminated many otherwise eligible studies.
Twelve studies, comprising more than seventy thousand adjudicated civil
cases, met the criteria for inclusion. In terms of the kinds of legal problems
and courts empirically investigated, the studies included in the review
closely resemble those that were excluded.69 The only exception to this
resemblance is the exclusion of all studies in family law. Because my
analysis is of wins and losses, I excluded studies of family cases; as
observers have noted, “[d]omestic disputes, unlike other civil disputes, are
difficult to assess regarding winners per se.”70
Table 1 lists the included studies, the number of cases that contribute to
the meta-analysis, the kinds of cases they include, and the kind of forum in
which the cases are heard. As the table reveals, existing studies prominently
feature areas of classical poverty law, such as administrative hearings about
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benefits and eviction defense for low-income tenants. But the studies also
include a range of civil justice problems faced across the population,
including tax appeals and hearings to contest the special education
classification of one’s children, as well as problems of employment law,
including social security disability insurance reconsideration hearings.71
Two studies investigate asylum requests, each looking separately at two
types of cases: those where people claim asylum as a defense to deportation
and those where they seek asylum affirmatively. Two studies investigate
hearings in small claims courts. Typically, the studies take the perspective
of a focal party, usually a person facing a business, a landlord, or a
government agency (such as a tenant facing eviction for nonpayment of
rent, an “Aid to Families with Dependent Children”72 recipient contesting a
reduction or termination of benefits, or a person appealing a state tax bill).
As Table 1 reports, the studies vary in two ways that will turn out to be
useful in the meta-analysis, as both provide some information about how
easy or difficult it might be for a lay person to attempt to represent himself
or herself. As the third column of the table notes, some studies are of
adjudication in traditional trial courts, while others are in tribunals or small
claims courts. These latter two kinds of forums often employ relaxed
evidence rules and sometimes permit a more narrative style of presentation
than do traditional trial courts. One of the principal purposes of the
reformers who pushed for these kinds of modified forums was to simplify
rules and procedures so that lay people could more effectively represent
themselves.73 To the extent that reformers’ aims were realized, we might
expect that the advantage of being represented by an attorney is less in
small claims courts or tribunals than it is in traditional trial courts.
The final column of the table includes an assessment of how complex the
documents and procedures are in the field of law that comprises the cases
included in each study. The measure comes from the 1995 Chicago
Lawyers Survey, a contemporary study of practicing attorneys, in which
these attorneys were asked to rate the procedural complexity of their own
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work.74 In this survey, a random sample of people eligible to practice law
with offices in Chicago were asked to rate their own practices in terms of
the degree to which someone without legal training or experience could
easily understand the documents and procedures used in their work. The
“procedural complexity measure” is the lawyers’ average rating on a scale
indicating the extent to which the procedures and documents involved in the
work required so much specialized skill and knowledge that they could not
be understood by an educated layperson. Raters are attorneys who reported
devoting at least 25 percent of their total work time to that field of law. That
is, for each field of law, the measure is the practitioners’ average response
to the item below:
Different kinds of law require different kinds of professional
activities. [Below are] a series of paired statements that describe
different demands made on the lawyer. These are presented as
polar opposites. Please circle the number that best represents your
position in relation to the two opposites. If the situation in your
practice is midway between poles, circle code 3; if your situation is
at one or the other extreme, circle 1 or 5; if your position leans
somewhat to either pole, circle 2 or 4.
A
The type and content of my
practice is such that even an
educated layman couldn’t
really understand or prepare
the documents

B
A para-professional could be
trained to handle many of the
procedures and documents in
my area of law

1 2 3 4 5
In computing the procedural complexity measure, I reverse coded the
scale, so that higher ratings indicated greater complexity. I standardized the
ratings for each field, so that fifty indicates the average score and each ten-
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point change indicates one standard deviation. I classified each study into
the broad field of law that most closely approximated the cases in the study.
Looking at the range of procedural complexity ratings, it is readily
apparent that the studies are centered in fields of law that lawyers regard as
average or below average relative to the scope of lawyers’ work. Ten
studies examine lawyers’ impact in trials or hearings involving fields of law
that lawyers rate as having roughly average complexity (a score of 46 to
51). Two studies examine lawyers’ impact on the outcomes of trials or
hearings that involve fields of law that lawyers rate as below average in
procedural complexity (43 on the procedural complexity scale). This
restricted range of complexity is an important factor to keep in mind when
considering the range of case types to which these findings may generalize.
Some kinds of civil justice problems encountered by people who might be
eligible for civil legal assistance—such as Medicaid eligibility cases, for
example—are arguably more complex than many of the kinds of cases
considered here. In general, whatever the findings about representation and
case outcomes, we cannot generalize those findings to highly complex
fields of law, as we have no information about those fields.
Table 1. Studies Contributing Data to the Meta-Analysis: Case Type,
Study Citation, Number of Cases Contributed, Field of Law, Type of
Forum, and Procedural Complexity Rating
Type of Case
(number of cases)

Field of Law

Forum
Type

State tax appeals
Kritzer, Herbert M. 1998. “The Wisconsin Tax
Appeals Commission.” Legal Advocacy:
Lawyers and Non-lawyers at Work. Ann Arbor,
MI: University of Michigan Press. pp. 79–110.
(137 cases)

Personal
income tax

Court
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Type of Case
(number of cases)

Field of Law

Forum
Type

Procedural
Complexity
Rating
43

Goldberg hearings
Hammer, Ronald P. and Joseph M. Hartley.
1978. “Procedural Due Process and the Welfare
Recipient: A Statistical Study of AFDC Fair
Hearings in Wisconsin.” Wisconsin Law Review.
pp 145–251.
(1,065 cases)

General
family
practice:
poverty-level
clients

Tribunal

Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)
reconsideration hearings
Subcommittee on Social Security of the
Committee on Ways and Means. 1975. “Report
of the Disability Claims Process Task Force.”
Recent Studies Relevant to the Disability
Hearings and Appeals Crisis. Washington, DC:
GPO. pp. 1–124.
(394 cases)

Employment
:
Unions/Empl
oyees

Tribunal

51

Evictions
Fusco, Anthony J., Jr., Nancy B. Collins, and
Julian R. Birnbaum. 1979. “Chicago’s Eviction
Court: A Tenants’ Court of No Resort.” Urban
Law Annual 17:93–132.
(1,061 cases)

Real Estate:
Landlord/Te
nant

Court

46

Cooper, Laura. 1979. “Goldberg’s Forgotten
Footnote: Is There a Due Process Right to a
Hearing Prior to the Termination of Welfare
Benefits When the Only Issue Raised is a
Question of Law.” Minnesota Law Review
64:1107–1179.
(280 cases)

Seron, Carroll, Gregg Van Ryzin, Martin
Frankel, and Jean Kovath. 2001. “The Impact of
Legal Counsel on Outcomes for Poor Tenants in
New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a
Randomized Experiment.” Law and Society
Review 35(2):419–434.
(200 cases)
Mosier, Marilyn Miller and Richard A. Soble.
1973–1974. “Modern Legislation, Metropolitan
Court, Miniscule Results: A Study of Detroit’s
Landlord-Tenant Court.” University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform 7:9–70.
(4,094 cases)
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Type of Case
(number of cases)

Field of Law

Forum
Type

Procedural
Complexity
Rating
48

Affirmative asylum requests
Kerwin, Donald. 2004. “Charitable Legal
Programs for Immigrants: What They Do, Why
They Matter and How They Can Be Expanded.”
Immigration Briefings 04–6:1–12.
(35,760 cases)

Immigration

Court

Immigration

Court

48

Special education certification hearings
Kirp, David, William Buss, Peter Kuriloff.
1974. “Legal Reform of Special Education:
Empirical Studies and Procedural Proposals.”
California Law Review 62:40–155.
(25 cases)

Civil
litigation:
personal

Tribunal

46

Small claims consumer cases
Steadman, John Montague and Richard S.
Rosenstein. 1972–1973. “‘Small Claims’
Consumer Plaintiffs in the Philadelphia
Municipal Court: An Empirical Study.”
University of Pennsylvania Law Review
121:1309–1361.
(67 cases)

Consumer
law:
consumer/
debtor

Small
claims
court

47

Small claims court
Sarat, Austin. 1976. “Alternatives in Dispute
Processing: Litigation in a Small Claims Court.”
Law and Society Review (Spring):337–376.
(109 cases)
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Small
claims
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Schoenholtz, Andrew I. and Jonathan Jacobs.
2001. “The State of Asylum Representation:
Ideas for Change.” Georgetown Immigration
Law Journal 16(4):739–772.
(20,696 cases)
Defensive asylum requests
(i.e., focal party is facing deportation)
Kerwin, Donald. 2004. “Charitable Legal
Programs for Immigrants: What They Do, Why
They Matter and How They Can Be Expanded.”
Immigration Briefings 04–6:1–12.
(5,794 cases)
Scoenholtz, Andrew I. and Jonathan Jacobs.
2001. “The State of Asylum Representation:
Ideas for Change.” Georgetown Immigration
Law Journal 16(4):739–772.
(2,803 cases)
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2. The Observed Difference between Lawyer-Represented and
Unrepresented Parties
Lawyer-represented people are more likely to prevail than people who
appear unrepresented, on average. Figure 2 reports for each study the
difference in likelihood that lawyer-represented people win in comparison
with the likelihood that unrepresented people win. Here, this difference,
which I will refer to as the “observed difference” between lawyerrepresented and unrepresented people’s case outcomes, is expressed as an
odds ratio.75 When an odds ratio equals one, the odds are even:
unrepresented people have just as good a chance of winning their cases, on
average, as do lawyer-represented people. Odds ratios less than 1.0 would
indicate that lawyer-represented people tend to have worse outcomes than
unrepresented people: the odds of their winning would be lower than the
odds of unrepresented people winning. Odds ratios greater than 1.0 indicate
that lawyer-represented people tend to have better outcomes (in terms of
winning their cases), on average, than do unrepresented people.
All of the odds ratios for all of the studies are greater than 1.0. As Figure
2 shows, lawyer-represented people do better—on average, lawyerrepresented people are more likely to win than are unrepresented people in
every study. But, though this difference consistently indicates that lawyerrepresented parties enjoy better outcomes than do unrepresented parties, just
how much better varies considerably across studies—from a study where
lawyer-represented people are 19 percent more likely to win than
unrepresented people, to studies where lawyer-represented people are three
or four times more likely to win, to a study which finds that lawyerrepresented people are almost fourteen times (odds ratio = 13.79) more
likely to win than are unrepresented people.
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Figure 2. Observed Difference in the Likelihood People Win in
Adjudication: Lawyer-Represented People Compared to
Unrepresented People76

N = 12 studies of 14 case groups, comprising 72,337 cases.
It is not clear from most existing studies how much of the observed
difference reflects how lawyers actually change case outcomes and how
much is due to other factors, such as characteristics of the lay litigants or the
cases themselves. The kinds of people who seek out and secure
representation by attorneys may be different from those who do not, and
these differences may be related to skills or personality traits that would
make these litigants more successful on their own, even without attorneys.
For example, they may have greater facility with English, or be more
organized, more persistent, or better at communicating information to legal
professionals than litigants who do not seek out attorneys or cannot secure
representation when they do. We might expect that people with the qualities
of language facility, organization, persistence, and good communication
skills would have been more likely to win their cases even without lawyers
to represent them. Similarly, the kinds of cases that end up being
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represented by lawyers are likely different from the kinds of cases that do
not. For example, cases that lawyers take may have more legal merit, more
easily available evidence, or better facts than cases that lawyers turn away.
Both of these potential differences—differences in litigant capacity to
represent themselves, and differences in the likelihood that cases will win
given the facts and the law—combine with what lawyers actually do in
litigation to create the differences in case outcomes that we observe
between lawyer-represented and self-represented people.
One study avoids this problem of interpretation by employing a
randomized trial. In this study, people waiting in line at a courthouse to
respond to a summons for eviction for nonpayment of rent were randomly
selected to receive lawyer advice and representation or to be told that no
lawyer was available to assist them at that time. Both groups of people,
those provided with attorneys as part of the research project and those told
that they could be offered no assistance, were then followed through to the
conclusion of their court cases. Because the research design matched
litigants to the conditions of lawyer representation or no representation
randomly (without reference to litigant characteristics or aspects of the
case), the differences observed in the outcomes of lawyer-represented and
unrepresented people are likely due to the presence of lawyers themselves,
as the two groups of cases differ in no other systematic way. This
randomized trial found a difference in the middle of the observed range. In
this study, tenants facing eviction for nonpayment of rent who were
represented by lawyers were more than 4.4 times more likely to retain
possession of their apartments than similar tenants who were not
represented.77
3. What Are Lawyers Doing that Creates the Observed Difference?
Evaluating the Role of Procedural Complexity
The magnitude of the observed difference varies widely across studies,
but this variation is patterned in instructive ways. Figure 3 reports on the
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average observed difference when studies are classified into four categories
based on the two dimensions of variation introduced in Table 1—procedural
complexity and type of hearing forum. The quantities in the figure are
weighted averages, calculated for each study and then weighted within each
category, so studies that contribute more cases weigh more heavily on the
average than smaller studies that contribute fewer cases.78
The first dimension of variation, reflected in the color of the bars, is
procedural complexity as rated by attorneys who practice in that field of
law. The fields of law for which lawyers provided complexity ratings in the
Chicago Lawyers Survey were not always at the same level of detail as the
fields of law included in the studies of lawyers’ impact. The process of
classifying the studies into fields thus involves measurement error: in some
instances, the fields of law for which we have complexity measures are
much broader than the fields of law represented in the studies (e.g., civil
litigation for personal clients versus education law, respectively). To the
extent that this measurement error is random with respect to the variables of
interest, it serves to reduce observed differences between categories of
cases—that is, it will make the differences appear smaller than they actually
are.79 The second dimension of variation is the kind of forum in which the
dispute is heard: it distinguishes traditional trial courts from small claims
courts and tribunals. As noted above, these latter types of forum were
specifically intended to be forums in which lay people could more easily
pursue their own cases.80
In the figure, studies in which the field of law is below average in
procedural complexity, as rated by attorneys, are represented by the darker
bar; studies in which attorneys rated procedural complexity as average are
indicated by the lighter bars. The left pair of bars reports the observed
difference in case outcomes between lawyer-represented and unrepresented
people in simplified forums (tribunals and small claims courts), while the
right bar reports the observed difference in traditional trial courts. None of
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the studies includes cases in fields of law of average complexity that are
heard in simplified forums.
The figure reveals a striking finding: the observed difference is much
greater for cases in those fields of law that lawyers rate as involving greater
procedural complexity. This is true even when such cases are heard in
simplified forums such as tribunals and small claims courts. The smallest
observed difference between lawyer-represented and unrepresented cases is
found in the two studies of welfare fair hearings, which involve a field of
law that attorneys rate as less procedurally complex and in which cases are
heard in a tribunal. In these two studies, focal parties represented by
attorneys are on average 40 percent more likely to prevail than are focal
parties who represent themselves. In studies of cases in fields that lawyers
rate as having average procedural complexity—tax, immigration,
employment law, landlord/tenant, consumer claims, and general personal
civil litigation—lawyers’ potential impact is much larger.
In this body of research, when procedural complexity is greater, the type
of forum in which the case is heard appears to make little difference. In
more complex fields of law, the observed difference in outcomes for
lawyer-represented and unrepresented people is quite large, depending on
whether the cases are heard in a court or in a simplified forum (like a
tribunal or small claims court). In fields of average complexity in trial
courts, lawyer-represented people are on average 6.5 times more likely to
win their cases than are unrepresented people in trial courts. In fields of
average complexity in tribunals, lawyer-represented people are on average
7.6 times more likely to win their cases than are unrepresented people.
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Figure 3. Observed Difference in Outcomes for Attorney-Represented
and Unrepresented People, by Forum Type and Procedural Complexity
of the Field of Law Involved in the Case: Odds ratios

The finding that the observed difference is larger when procedures are
more complex suggests that part of what lawyers do to affect litigation
outcomes may be assisting people in managing procedural complexity. Of
course, we cannot know that procedural complexity is the only, or even the
largest, factor creating the differences we observe. And, as I noted earlier,
we cannot know how much of the observed difference is due to what
lawyers are doing and how much is due to differences in the kinds of cases
or litigants that end up having attorneys to represent them. And, of course,
we would like to have many more studies on which to base such a
conclusion. But the finding that procedural complexity bears a relationship
to the size of the observed difference is very suggestive.
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IV. ACCESS TO LAW AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
A. The Impact of Expanded Access to Counsel
The finding that procedural complexity may account for at least a portion
of lawyers’ impact on case outcomes provides some insight into how
expanded access to counsel, whether through a “right” or other means,
might affect the American public’s experience with its civil justice
problems. Procedural complexity involves two distinct kinds of practical
challenges for a lay litigant: figuring out what is specifically legal about
one’s problems and figuring out how to pursue one’s problems using the
formal legal system. Complexity likely raises the bar on both of these
dimensions: greater complexity makes it more difficult for lay litigants to
identify legally cognizable claims, and it further makes it difficult for lay
people to pursue those claims through hearings, trials, and legal documents.
Consider, as an example, a type of case that features in three of the
studies in the meta-analysis: evictions. No national empirical picture of
evictions exists, so we do not know how many evictions occur each year,
nor do we know what most evictions are like. We do not know the typical
issues of law raised in evictions around the country, nor do we know about
the prevalence of different kinds of facts. For example, we do not know the
usual reasons that landlords move for eviction. Nor do we know how many
evictions involve fact situations that are favorable or unfavorable to one
side or another, such as how many evictions for breach of lease involve
actual breaches. One likely very common allegation in evictions is
nonpayment of rent. One author suggests that “[p]erhaps the most common
reason a landlord seeks a tenant’s removal is because the tenant has not paid
the rent.”81 A recent study in San Mateo County, California, found that
almost two-thirds (65 percent) of eviction filings alleged nonpayment of
rent. This proportion may have been lower than in typical years, as the
mortgage crisis contributed to many post-foreclosure evictions (27 percent
of those filed).82 Because evictions for nonpayment of rent are apparently a
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common—and perhaps the most common—type of eviction, I will take
them as the exemplary case.
Lay litigants may have poor skills when it comes to figuring out what
their peculiarly legal problems are. For example, among people who face
eviction for not paying their rent, some will, in fact, have not paid it. The
reasons they did not pay their rent may be socially legitimate reasons, in
that both the defaulting tenant and many other people would recognize them
as legitimate excuses for not paying rent. For example, someone may have a
child who is very ill and requires expensive medication. If this family has
no health insurance, because they cannot afford it, they will have to pay outof-pocket for that medication. Given limited resources, they may have to
choose between paying the rent and treating their child’s illness with costly
drugs. Or, the car that someone relies on for traveling to a job that supports
her family may need expensive repairs. She must repair the car to keep the
job but, given limited resources, that may mean not paying the rent. Most of
us would probably be in sympathy with a parent’s choice to pay for
necessary medicines ahead of rent. Many of us would also sympathize with
the parent who did what was necessary to keep her job even though that
meant not fulfilling other obligations, such as paying rent as part of a rental
contract. But neither of these defenses is typically legally cognizable.
A tenant who had not paid the rent might still have some means of
staving off the eviction. In some jurisdictions, the tenant might be able to
get some or all of the unpaid rent rebated under an implied warranty of
habitability, if the premises were deficient under housing codes.83 However,
not all low-income housing is bad enough to justify rent rebates. Eviction
requires that proper notice be served on the tenant. The notice of eviction
might have been defective or improperly served.84 However, notices are not
always incorrect or improperly served. In the absence of a habitability claim
or a defective notice, the tenant in rent arrears has little legal leverage to
counter the eviction.
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How could an attorney assist in this hypothetical case—perhaps a very
common one—where a poor person faces eviction for not paying rent that
she, in fact, has not paid? An attorney could have the expertise to
understand, explain, and collect the evidence for habitability violations. The
attorney could also make that case for the tenant in court. An attorney could
do similar tasks if the notice of eviction were defective. Even if the case
involved good notice and safe and secure premises, an attorney could advise
the tenant about the situation and the tenant’s options and try to help limit
the collateral damage of being sued for eviction. The attorney could help the
tenant file an answer, which would effectively stay the judgment until a trial
date and give the tenant a few weeks in which to try to find new premises.85
The tenant, with the attorney’s assistance, could also try to settle with the
landlord without proceeding to trial. An attorney might also help the tenant
get out of the apartment without an adverse judgment that would appear on
his or her credit rating.86
However, ironically, the attorney might be least useful in this situation
when representing the tenant in court. Given the usual law and these
hypothetical facts (unpaid rent, properly served notice, no habitability
issues), if the tenant followed the eviction all the way through to trial, the
outcome of adjudication could well be the same whether or not the tenant
was represented by an attorney; the landlord would regain possession of the
apartment, and the tenant would receive a judgment of eviction.
This example highlights two ways that an expanded access to counsel
might affect public experience with civil justice problems. First, the
example suggests that greater access to attorneys could be a form of public
legal education. Attorneys could give members of the public assistance in
figuring out what their legal claims might be or, indeed, whether they have
any legal claims at all. Many unjust, unfair, appalling, and regrettable
events happen in the world; the legal system, for better or for worse, has
remedies for only a few of them. Part of the impact of an expanded access
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to counsel could be to better inform the public about the practical scope of
the legal system.
If this reasoning is correct, then an expanded access to counsel would
increase the share of litigants who appeared in court with legally cognizable
claims and defenses. Part of this change in the pool of adjudicated cases
would occur because people with legally cognizable claims (who currently
do not know how to identify those claims) would be able to make claims
with the assistance of lawyers. At the same time, more cases with legal
grounds would be appearing on dockets in part because greater access to
attorneys would lead to fewer groundless cases in court. In some instances,
lawyers might well advise potential litigants to forgo pursuing their claims
through law and assist them in seeking out other solutions, like attempting
to negotiate mutually acceptable resolutions with the other parties involved
in their civil justice problems.
Second, the example suggests that greater access to attorneys might lead
to more legally accurate decisions on the part of adjudicators. The second
aspect of complexity that I identified involved getting the problem through
the formal legal process: filling out and filing legal forms, writing
pleadings, making motions, presenting legal arguments, figuring out what is
admissible as evidence, using that evidence appropriately and effectively,
etc. Part of the reason that unrepresented litigants fare so poorly may be the
sheer confusion created by all of the documents and procedures that are
outside their usual experience. Studies investigating the experiences of lay
people who appear unrepresented in courts and tribunals show that many
have great difficulty translating their goals and experiences into legal terms,
and that court staff are often not helpful to them. 87 The impact of expanded
access to lawyers would likely be to increase the rates at which currently
unrepresented people won their cases, because lawyers’ understanding of
procedure would reveal meritorious claims that are currently buried under
unrepresented litigants’ confusion about, and misunderstanding of, the
formal legal process. In pools of cases where the people in these studies
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typically face opponents who have lawyer representation, expanded access
to lawyers for these people might also help to reduce the advantage
currently enjoyed by their lawyered-up adversaries.
Focusing narrowly on the small share of civil justice problems that ever
become court cases, these findings suggest considerable scope for the
impact of lawyers. It is not clear, though, that lawyers are necessary to
achieve the impacts identified here—at least not for the types of ordinary
litigation in fields of low to average complexity that have been investigated
in the studies reviewed. Recall that the complexity that appears to trip up
the lay public does not seem especially complex to lawyers. The studies in
which we observe the largest differences between lawyer-represented and
unrepresented people involve law that holds average complexity compared
to the full scope of lawyers’ work.
This average level of complexity might be manageable through other
means than expanded access to attorneys. In some U.S. forums, nonlawyer
advocates are already allowed to appear.88 My own research, and that of
other scholars, suggests that these nonlawyer advocates, when trained and
experienced, can be at least as effective as attorneys in assisting people in
pursuing their claims in tribunals.89 Similarly, if complex procedures create
barriers in access to justice, jurisdictions might tackle this problem directly
by simplifying the procedures themselves, in favor of supplying
representatives to assist lay people in navigating them.90
All three of these solutions are quite traditional and have been repeatedly
proposed for years: more access to lawyers,91 more access to nonlawyer
advocates,92 and simplified procedures that would allow lay people to more
easily use law to pursue resolution of their justice problems.93 What is
traditional about all of these solutions is their focus on formal legal
institutions as the universal response to justice problems.
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B. Beyond Access to Law: Access to Justice
1. Three Empirical Realities Ignored By the Traditional Focus on Law
This traditional focus on law is, unfortunately, myopic.94 It ignores three
empirical realities that should inspire us to new thinking about access to
justice. The first reality is that Americans typically do not understand their
civil justice problems as legal problems. Decades of research show not only
that Americans usually do not turn to lawyers and courts with their justice
problems,95 but also that law often does not even enter their thinking about
these problems.96 Perhaps Americans act and think this way because law is
not available; but, perhaps they would also prefer the opportunity to have
access to other nonlegal sources of advice and assistance for these very
common problems.
In the United Kingdom (U.K.), another common law country, people
appear quite happy to go to an established advice sector (staffed by
nonlawyers) to gain information and advice for resolving their justice
problems, often without taking formal legal action. People in the U.K. go to
this advice sector even when lawyers’ services are heavily subsidized or
free (as they are for more than two-fifths of the population).97 U.K.
residents also enjoy another resource absent in the American context: a
group of government ombudsmen’s offices, empowered to independently
investigate and authoritatively resolve civil justice problems involving a
variety of regulated industries, including common problems with insurers,
pensions, banks, and the like.98
Whether lawyers and courts are the proper solution to a justice problem
depends on what one’s goals are, and the traditional U.S. approach to legal
aid assumes the goal is more law. But, in fact, we know very little about the
American public’s goals with respect to their own justice problems. U.S.
civil justice surveys do not ask people what they would have liked to do
about their justice problems, but rather about whether or not they consulted
a lawyer for those problems. Instead of a day in court, what members of the
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public may often want is simply to have their problems resolved or their
options explained to them. The U.K. experience reviewed above suggests
that lawyers and courts are not always necessary for resolution and
explanation. Conceptually, empirically, and in policy, we should be
considering a much wider range of sources of resolution, rather than forcing
a single vision on a very diverse public experiencing a wide variety of
justice problems.
The second reality is that when poor people in the United States do have
access to law, they seldom receive complex legal services. One can see this
pattern in the LSC’s reports of the services that its grantees provide. Most
of the LSC’s civil legal services provided to poor people do not involve
representation in court. In 2008, most cases taken by the LSC (60.3 percent)
were closed with “counsel and advice,” which includes services such as “the
advocate ascertain[ing] and review[ing] relevant facts, exercise[ing]
judgment in interpreting the particular facts presented by the client and in
applying the relevant law to the facts presented, and counsel[ing] the client
concerning his or her legal problem.”99 Another 18.7 percent of cases were
closed with “limited action,” which includes actions like “communication
by letter, telephone or other means to a third party” and “preparation of a
simple legal document such as a routine will or power of attorney.”100
A minority of closed cases received representation in some kind of court
case or hearing, though it is not possible to determine precisely how many,
given the way the LSC collects case reporting data. Contested court
decisions and appeals combined closed 3.7 percent of cases;101 4.6 percent
of cases were closed by “settlement with litigation.”102 Agency decisions
closed 3.2 percent of cases, and 2.4 percent of cases received “extensive
services,” which can include “extensive ongoing assistance to clients who
are proceeding pro se.”103 So, something less than 20 percent of the cases
served by the LSC-involved lawyers appearing on behalf of clients in courts
or hearings. The pattern of services, which heavily favors information,
advice, and basic assistance over representation, in part reflects legal aid
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agencies’ strategic decisions about how to effectively use scarce
resources.104 But it is also, in part, a reflection of what many people may
typically need with respect to common justice problems, as illustrated in the
eviction example above. We might consider whether it is actually necessary
that lawyers per se provide these basic legal services.
The third problem with the field’s narrow focus on the formal legal
institutions of lawyers and courts is that it presumes a questionably feasible
solution to an empirically enormous problem. In 2008, LSC-funded
programs closed something fewer than nine hundred thousand cases,105
receiving total funding from all sources that amounted to about $990 per
closed case.106 Recall that by a conservative estimate, more than twenty-five
million LSC-eligible people are living in households already affected by at
least one justice problem. No one knows precisely how much is spent to
subsidize access to civil justice in the United States, but one observer puts
this figure at around one billion dollars each year.107 To expand the basic
levels of services currently provided to serve every LSC-eligible client with
a civil justice problem, how much more funding would we need? Lawyers
are expensive. A recent estimate suggests that providing one additional hour
of lawyers’ services to the existing justice problem for each household
would require “a twenty-fold increase in current U.S. levels of public and
private (charitable) legal aid funding.”108 Twenty billion dollars is small
change in the context of $3.6 trillion or so in total federal spending and a
gross domestic product of $14.6 trillion.109 However, it is a massive
increase in the context of current levels of funding for access to civil justice.
More access to law is part of the answer, but only part.
Expanding access to nonlegal institutions of remedy for civil justice
problems is an innovative solution that responds to all three of these
empirical realities—the fact that Americans often do not think of their
justice problems as legal; the fact that many could benefit from services that
could be provided by nonlawyers and; the high cost of lawyers’ services as
they are currently produced. Nonlegal institutions of remedy provide
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advice, information, and authoritative resolution of civil justice problems,
but “without requiring public contact with courts, tribunals, lawsuits,
litigation or lawyers.”110 A robust and effective set of nonlegal institutions
would include both a component that is “empowered to produce
authoritative resolution to the public’s civil justice problems”111 and a set of
auxiliaries that “work apart from formal institutions of remedy by providing
problem-resolution strategies that, although not authoritative, may
nevertheless be very effective from the public’s perspective.”112
2. Twin Pillars for New Nonlegal Institutions of Remedy
These new nonlegal institutions of remedy would rest on two pillars. The
first would be a nationally present, nonlawyer advice sector that centers its
work around substantive problems that people commonly confront. As in
the U.K., these advisors should be empowered to give legal advice. Their
advice would not be limited to legal routes to obtain solutions; rather, it
would be focused on helping people understand their options and resolve
their substantive problems. Such services could provide many Americans
with the information and assistance they need to resolve many of the kinds
of justice problems they face today, often without recourse to formal law.
These advice services might be public or charitable, but we also might
consider market-based models for the provision of nonlawyer advice. In any
event, implementing this policy would, of course, require relaxing lawyers’
monopoly on the provision of legal advice, as has been advocated by
others.113
The second pillar of the new U.S. nonlegal institutions of remedy would
be authoritative nonlegal routes to the resolution of justice problems. One of
the most promising forms of such institutions is government ombudsmen’s
offices. Ombudsmen’s offices are empowered to independently investigate
and authoritatively resolve complaints by the public about vendors in the
industries that they oversee.114 As the U.K.’s Financial Ombudsman Service
puts it, “these offices are ‘the official independent expert[s] in settling . . .
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complaints, with the power to put things right.”115 As noted above, my own
research shows that, in contexts where such nonlegal solutions are
available, people use them, doing so even when publicly subsidized
attorney services are also available.116 In the contemporary United States,
perhaps the most prominent regulated industries appearing in the public’s
civil justice problems are financial services and health care, including health
insurance.117 In addition to the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
czar,118 we should seriously consider a Consumer Financial Protection
Ombudsman. A similar office could be created to resolve consumers’
problems with health insurance providers. These problems are frequent
now, but likely will become much more common as many more people will
soon have health insurance; the recent health care reform bill will expand
the population covered by both public and private insurers by thirty million
people.119

CONCLUSION
Many millions of people in this country face civil justice problems that
can and often do have far-reaching effects on their lives. More than fifty
million people are currently eligible for LSC-funded civil legal aid. The
best available evidence suggests that at least half of them are living in
households facing at least one civil justice problem. Even though most of
these problems never make it to courts, tribunals, or attorneys’ offices, the
existing legal aid resources of the country are overstretched by any measure.
The tens of millions of people facing civil justice problems and eligible
under current means tests for aid have access to perhaps one full-time civil
legal assistance attorney for every five thousand people eligible for that
attorney’s services—and that is if one includes as sources of civil legal
assistance not just LSC-funded legal aid, but also legal aid lawyers salaried
from other sources and lawyers working in organized civil pro bono
programs.120 Given these facts, it is no surprise that, in recent studies of its
own offices’ capacity to serve, the LSC found that these offices must turn
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away for lack of resources at least as many people as they are able to
help.121
The seemingly overwhelming nature of the present problem constitutes a
necessity that can spur innovation, both in how we think about access to
civil justice and in what we do about it. Choosing what solutions to employ
in any given reform should be substantially an empirical question—that is,
we should use empirical evidence to guide us in deciding when simplifying
procedures would be an adequate solution, when a nonlawyer advocate or
legal advice from a nonlawyer advisor would be sufficient, or when
situations need fully qualified attorneys. We certainly do not yet have the
evidence base we need to make these kinds of determinations. The
significant deficits in our understanding should be an impetus to get
working.
But choosing between solutions cannot be a completely empirical
question. We first have to decide on what goals we want these solutions to
achieve. The people bearing the greatest weight of the current failures of
our institutions of remedy for civil justice problems are the public. They
should be consulted about what they want when they face civil justice
problems.
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